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ABSTRACT
HETZKE, KARL    Understanding the Islamist Constituency: An Empirical 
Analysis of Turkey's 2002 Parliamentary Elections. Department(s) of Political 
Science and Economics.
ADVISORS: Davis, Lewis and Dallas, Mark
Since 2002, Turkey's secular republic has been ruled by the Islamist politicians of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  Confusing many observers, the AKP is 
simultaneously one of the most progressive parties to ever rule Turkey on issues like 
European Union membership and relations with the West, while also one of the most 
conservative parties to ever rule on issues related to the role of religion in public life, 
such as Islamic education in public schools.  The goal of this project is to determine, 
through an empirical analysis of how the AKP came to power, whether the success of the 
AKP should be viewed as Islamist actors moving toward the center to accommodate a 
modernizing electorate, or as an electorate becoming more conservative and thereby 
choosing to vote for a conservative, Islamist party.
Using provincial-level data, this project examines the 2002 parliamentary election 
in light of competing narratives to explain the AKP's accession.  This study finds that, 
contrary to many understandings, the AKP's efforts to make the party appear more 
modern and forward-thinking had very little impact on the election.  This study also finds 
that the effects of the 1999 earthquakes in northwestern Turkey, though positive and 
significant for the AKP, were significantly tapered by existing ideology.  The AKP should 
not be viewed as an Islamist party becoming moderate, but as a party succeeding with a 
more conservative electorate.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
Since 2002, Turkey's secular republic has been ruled by the Islamist politicians of 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  Confusing many observers, the AKP is 
simultaneously one of the most progressive parties to ever rule Turkey on issues like 
European Union membership and relations with the West, while also one of the most 
conservative parties to ever rule on issues related to the role of religion in public life, 
such as Islamic education in public schools.  The goal of this project is to determine, 
through an analysis of how the AKP came to power, whether the success of the AKP 
should be viewed as Islamist actors becoming more moderate to accommodate a 
modernizing electorate, or as an electorate becoming more conservative and thereby more 
accepting of a conservative, Islamist party.
___________
As the 20th century came to a close, a great deal of scholarly work went into 
answering the question of whether or not Islam is compatible with democracy.  Extremely 
notable thinkers argued that something inherent in Muslim culture is ill-suited to establish 
the cultural values required for a stable democracy (Fukuyama [1992], Huntington [1984, 
1991] Lipset [1994]) while others argued that Islam isn't necessarily adversarial to 
democracy, but may need to adopt democracy in its own way (Benin & Stork [1997], 
Eickelman & Piscatori [1996], Entelis [1997], Esposito & Voll [1996]).  Both sides 
agreed, however, that there is something unique about Muslim society which makes 
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Western-style democracy difficult to install.  To this day, Islamism persists as an almost 
shockingly powerful alternative to liberal democracy.  The 2011 revolution in Egypt had 
all the makings of liberal, democratic reform – Egypt's long-ruling dictator, Hosni 
Mubarak, was peacefully overthrown by millions of religiously and economically diverse 
demonstrators, and free elections were held – but to the amazement of the West, 62% of 
the vote in the first parliamentary election went to two Islamist parties: the Muslim 
Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, and the Salafi's Al-Nour Party (Elsayyad & 
Shima'a [2014]).  The new parliament didn't last long before military authorities 
dissolved it, but the elections demonstrated that even when democracy is introduced to a 
state by its own citizens, Islamism remains a potent political force.
For over fifty years, Turkey has served as the West's beacon of hope for 
democratic reform in the Islamic Middle East.  The fact that Turkey is the only Muslim-
majority state in the Middle East where anything close to liberal democracy has been 
established has caused many scholars to speculate as to whether or not “the model” for 
reconciling Islam and democracy could be found in Turkey (Çavdar [2006], Secor [2011], 
Atasoy [2011], Khattab [2012]).  Since 1950, Turkey has been a relatively free, election-
holding, secular republic, and therefore the closest thing to a liberal democracy in the 
Islamic Middle-East.  This is not to say that Turkey is a liberal democracy – since 1950, 
parliament has been dissolved by military authorities on four separate occasions – but 
Turkey has still made some of the largest strides toward liberal democracy in the Muslim 
world.  Even in secular Turkey, however, Islamism remains a legitimate political force.  
The first Islamist party to field candidates for parliament was the National Order 
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Party, founded in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan.  Under Erbakan's leadership, National 
Order (renamed National Salvation in 1972) became one of the most polarizing parties of 
the decade.  In 1980, political unrest forced the military to declare martial law, and 
Erbakan's National Salvation Party was forcibly disbanded.  In the early 1980's Erbakan's 
colleagues founded a new party, the Welfare Party, and ran their first candidates in 1987. 
By 1995, the Welfare Party won enough votes for Erbakan to become Prime Minister.  By 
early 1997, the military would once again intervene to rid themselves of Erbakan, whom 
they viewed as a threat to the Republic's secular constitutiion, and the Welfare Party was 
no more.  After an unsuccessful attempt to field candidates under the banner of Virtue 
Party in 1999, a younger generation of Islamist politicians detached themselves from 
Erbakan and founded the AKP.  In 2002, the AKP secured two-thirds of the seats in 
parliament and became the first Islamist party to form a unilateral government.  
Many view the AKP as the most moderate of all Turkey's Islamist parties, and 
claim that the AKP's success is primarily driven by economic factors, not ideological 
ones (Taşpınar [2012]).  With such a viewpoint, it is easy to interpret the AKP as having 
moved toward the center to appease the electorate, and by extension to interpret the AKP 
as a case-study for successful engagement between conservative Islamists and secular 
liberals in a democratic context.  An alternative reading, however, is more suspicious of 
the AKP's Islamist roots, and sees their success as part of a changing ideological 
landscape where right-wing nationalism and religious conservatism are becoming 
increasingly powerful forces (Çarkoğlu [2002]).  If one moment could be studied to 
distinguish between these two readings, it would be the 2002 parliamentary election. 
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Whether or not the AKP is an Islamist party that liberalized or an Islamist party that was 
elected by a more conservative population is entirely dependent on an understanding of 
how the AKP was actually elected.
Short-term readings of the 2002 elections often point to various campaigning 
strengths of the AKP, such as successfully framing themselves not as “Islamist” but as 
“conservative democratic” (Findley [2010]), or for the party's openness to traditionally 
non-Islamist policies like pursuing EU membership (Ersel [2013]), or simply for their 
hugely popular leader, former Istanbul mayor, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was able to 
successfully rally the periphery against the center and happened to come out on top 
(Hoşgōr [2008]).  Other, more long-term readings point to ongoing changes in the 
Turkish political climate during the latter half of the 20th century which made Islamism, 
or influences of Islamist thought, much more palpable by the 21st century, such as the 
state's official acknowledgment of Islam as part of the national heritage in the early 
1970s, and the reintroduction of Quran courses in public schools (Şen [2010]).  In a few 
studies, empirical methods are employed to explain how certain economic events, like a 
financial crisis in 2001, may have contributed to the AKP's support (Çarkoğlu [2002], 
Akarca [2008]).
This project examines how the AKP came to power through a close empirical 
examination of the 2002 election.  Using Ordinary Least Squares regression estimations 
with provincial-level voting data, this project tests competing explanations for the AKP's 
accession.  The analysis finds that the majority of the AKP's constituency in 2002 came 
from areas where Islamism and right-wing nationalism were already popular ideologies, 
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although a good number of votes did come from more liberal areas.  Contrary to many 
understandings, the AKP's efforts to make the party appear more modern and forward-
thinking had very little impact on the election.  This is evidenced in this study's finding 
that the AKP was no more successful than their Islamist predecessors at winning votes 
from urban populations, educated populations, or populations where women composed a 
large part of the work force.  The study also connects the AKP's success to two 
earthquakes in 1999 (which are thought to have discredited incumbent parties), but finds 
that the earthquakes cannot be held responsible for major ideological shifts.  Taken all 
together, the empirical results presented in this paper suggest that the AKP should not be 
viewed as an example of Islamist actors adapting to meet a moderate electorate, but as an 
electorate adapting to accept Islamism as an ideology.
___________
The following chapters provide the basis for empirical analysis, and then present 
the findings of that analysis.  Chapter Two provides historical background on secularism 
and religious opposition in Turkey from 1923-1982.  Chapter Three reviews the events 
which led to the founding of the AKP, and identifies five distinct hypotheses scholars 
propose to explain their rise to power.  Chapter Four reviews the collection of data and 
the details of empirical analysis, while Chapter Five reviews the conclusions from that 
empirical analysis.  Chapter Six briefly discusses the implications of the conclusions 
drawn from the empirical analysis.
Hetzke 6
Hetzke 7
Chapter Two
A Brief History of the Republic: 
From Atatürk to Constitutional Reform – 1923-1982
The goal of this chapter is to provide a historical narrative which, at its 
conclusion, gives the reader an understanding of Turkish political-culture until the 
constitutional reforms of 1982, and in particular, the relationship between secularist and 
Islamist forces in electoral politics.  To understand how the AKP came to power in 2002, 
it is important to understand how Islamist parties developed their ideology, and how 
Islamist ideology fits into the ideological framework of Turkish political discourse.  This 
chapter begins with an overview of the founding of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, and the founding principles of Kemalism.  From there, the narrative 
continues with an examination of how political participation evolved into a “center-vs-
periphery” dichotomy during an era when military leadership often interfered with free-
elections.  Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion on the first attempts by Islamists to 
find their electoral voice from 1960-1982, under the leadership of  Necmettin Erbakan.
The Foundation of the Republic: 1923-1950
The influence of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the Turkish Republic is difficult to 
overstate.  Today, his exploits as an authoritarian, and at times brutal, leader are more 
controversial than ever, but it is neither the intention of this chapter nor this study to 
explore any of these controversies thoroughly; ample scholarly work has already be done 
on that subject (Bay [2011], Haniǧlu [2011], Kinross [1964], Mango [1999]). 
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Nevertheless,  Atatürk's legacy on Turkish political-culture remains intact, and an 
understanding of modern Turkey requires some basic understanding of the Republic's 
founding, in particular the foundational principles of Kemalism.
Upon completion of his studies at various Ottoman military colleges, Mustafa 
Kemal found himself in the company of some of the most liberal, westward-leaning 
political activists in the Empire, the Committee of Union and Progress (better known as 
“the Young Turks”), but his role in this organization was far from prominent.  When the 
Ottomans joined with the Central Powers during World War I, Atatürk1 was appointed 
commander of a division sent to the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915.  At Gallipoli, Atatürk 
successfully contained a major allied landing – a success which would become the 
foundation for his reputation among his peers – and as defeated Germans withdrew from 
Anatolia, Atatürk briefly became commander of all remaining Ottoman forces on the 
front.  In 1920, the Allies dissolved the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul, and in response, 
Atatürk established the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet  
Meclisi – TBMM) in Ankara.  He valiantly led military resistance to allied partitioning of 
remaining Ottoman territory, expelled invading Greeks from Anatolia, and established an 
armistice with the Allies in 1923.  On October 29, 1923 the TBMM proclaimed a republic 
and elected Atatürk as its first president.  Over the next three years, Atatürk purged 
opposition from within his own party and, when an attempt on his life was thwarted in 
1926,  eventually shut down the major opposition parties, firmly establishing a single-
party, authoritarian regime. (Mango [2002] 9-12).
1 The surname “Atatürk” (translated “Father of the Turks”) was not appropriated until 1934, however for 
sake of simplicity I use it to reference the man at any point in his career
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Here, a great historical paradox is uncovered.  Atatürk, in many respects a 
Westward-gazing liberal, built into the first Turkish constitution all of the institutions 
necessary for a liberal, western style democracy, but left them inoperable throughout his 
reign – the man who built a democracy ruled it like a dictator.   Atatürk's successor, 
General İsmet İnönü, continued to the lead the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) at the 
helm of a single-party, autocratic regime  where it remained until 1950.  In 1950, 
however, the first open elections gave the opposing party a resounding victory, and the 
CHP stepped down. (Magnarella [1998] 223). Turkey is “perhaps the only country in 
modern history in which an autocratic regime peacefully gave up the reigns of 
government” (Tachau [1972] 382).
During his reign as President, Atatürk ushered in a series of dramatic reforms not 
only to politics, but to culture and society as well.  Atatürk's ideology, known now as 
Kemalism, rested on six pillars: republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, 
reformism, and secularism.  Although each pillar was, in its own right, a revolutionary 
break from the Ottoman past, it was perhaps the last pillar, secularism, which marked the 
most fundamental and dramatic shift in politics and culture from the 19th to the 20th 
century (Karpat [1959]).  
While the institutional changes which brought Anatolia from an imperial sultanate 
to a republican, semi-liberal democracy were certainly huge, Atatürk's total severance 
between Islam and the state was without doubt his most ambitious reform.  During his 
tenure as President, Atatürk oversaw the abolition of the Capliphate (an institution 
revered not only by Turks, but by much of the Sunni Muslim world) and Sultanate, the 
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Latinization of the Turkish alphabet, the closing of religious schools and orders, the 
removal of Islam as the official state religion, replacement of Islamic law with European 
codes, and the prohibition of the Fez. (Magnarella [1998] 220).  Atatürk's distaste for 
Islam was both ideological and pragmatic.  It was pragmatic in the sense that he did not 
feel Islam to be a strong enough unifying force on which to build a nation; he had 
personally witnessed Muslims fighting Muslims time and again, and various Ottoman 
leaders strive in vain to rally the “Muslim world” on behalf of whatever cause the 
Ottoman state needed to push.  It was ideological in the sense that Atatürk was largely 
influenced by the political thought of the French Revolution; the revolution's laïcité-
republic, as well as Rousseau's ideas of popular sovereignty.  He also held no religious 
conviction himself, which made it very easy to separate religion from matters of state in 
his own thought. (Mango [2002])
Kemalist secularism is not simple separation of church-and-state.  Kemalism 
dictates that religion ought to be controlled and monitored by the state so as to be kept 
out of the affairs of state.  Ironically, the Republic accomplished a degree of religious 
suppression through institutions inherited from the Ottoman's era of state-sponsored 
religion.  According to a study by RAND Corp. “The instrument for regulating Islam is 
the Diyanet İşleri Başkanliği, or Directorate of Religious Affairs, an office that reports to 
the prime minister and has a budget larger than that of most ministries.” (Rabasa [2008] 
11)  Until free-elections were held in 1950, the Republican People's Party often exercised 
the power of the state to regulate religion.  During this period, the military developed a 
fierce loyalty to Kemalist secularism and for the remainder of the century would often 
Hetzke 11
intervene to oust parliaments which strayed to far from this ideology.
Elections and Coups: 1950-1980
As already noted, the first truly free elections held in the new Republic occurred 
in 1950, during which the controlling CHP lost (and peacefully ceded) power to the 
Democrat Party (DP).     From 1950-1982, Turkey experimented with a multi-party 
democracy, which at times allowed for opposition groups to form and operate freely, and 
at others involved military takeovers of parliament.  This era finally came to an end when 
martial law was declared in 1980, all political parties were disassembled and banned, and 
the constitution was rewritten in 1982.
The Democrat Party technically formed in 1945, filling its ranks with dissident 
members of the Republican Peoples Party.  Very quickly the Democrats came to represent 
a diverse constituency of small-businessmen, religious minorities who had to pay 
discriminatory taxes, urban consumers disgruntled by high-costs of living, and “millions 
of peasants who resented the [Republican People's Party]'s neglect of agriculture and 
suppression of religious expression.” (Magnarella [1998] 222; Rustow [1957]).  The 
Democrats contrasted themselves with their authoritarian predecessors by paying more 
attention to the needs of rural areas through electric projects, farm credits, roads and 
many other projects.  The Democrats were also much more open to public expression of 
religion and religious tolerance, bringing back Arabic call to prayer and including Islamic 
courses as optional classes at public schools.
The reign of the Democrat Party gave rise to one of the most important social 
divides in Turkish politics and society, the divide between the “center” and the 
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“periphery.”  Many scholars see in Turkey an ongoing, dichotomous and antagonistic 
relationship between center and periphery, or “state” and “society,” and would argue that 
this dichotomy offers the best model on which to base analysis. (Mardin [1973], Hoşgōr 
[2008])  In these first experimental years with multi-party democracy, the Republican 
Peoples Party (loyal to Kemalist ideology) represented the state, or center, and was 
supported by urban elites, civil bureaucrats, military men, and the urban poor.  The 
center-right Democrat Party represents the periphery; a diverse constituency of mostly 
rural civilians which make up the bulk of the nation's population.  The divide between the 
two groups was exacerbated by the fact that while Atatürk's cultural reforms were 
strikingly successful in urban centers where the state's bureaucracy was actually strong 
enough administer them, many rural citizens found themselves far beyond the reaches of 
state propaganda.  This divide was pronounced even further by both the state's inability to 
effectively regulate religious institutions beyond urban centers and the already more 
conservative and religiously devout nature of the rural population.
The Democrats ruled for a decade from '50-'60.  During this time they lost the 
confidence of civil bureaucrats, and more importantly, the military.  The military staged a 
bloodless coup in 1960, arresting and replacing most of the Democrat Party members 
holding office.  For eleven months, political parties were banned and the state was 
overseen by a body called the National Unity committee.  When the ban was lifted in 
1961, former Democrat Party members reorganized themselves into the Justice Party and 
New Turkey Party, and the two parties collectively won almost 50% of the vote.  This left 
the military discouraged.  As the economy began to decline over the next decade, civil 
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society became restless.  Leftist views became more prominent in the media and lower-
level government bureaucracies while student demonstrations and often turned into 
violent strikes and anti-government protests. As a result, military leaders felt the need to 
step in again in 1971 and once again the elected government was replaced by the military. 
For the next two years, the military purged itself of leftist officers, and shut down some 
of the more extremist political parties, including the Marxist Turkish Workers Party and 
the Islamist National Salvation Party (a party which will be discussed in greater detail in 
the next section). (Magnarella [1998]).
When free elections returned in 1973, parties on both sides of the center/periphery 
divide were so weakened by factional splits that the ensuing decade could be 
characterized as weak coalitions unable to handle major challenges.  These weak 
coalitions found themselves incapable of handling the turmoil which was about to ensue. 
On both the right and the left, dissident citizens joined political organizations which often 
advocated violence; terrorism and crime of all sorts spread throughout the country and in 
1980, martial law was declared once more.  This would be the last time the military 
interfered directly with civilian government.
What is perhaps most striking about this era of elections and coups is the 
tremendously high mortality rate of organized opposition groups.  As platforms for free 
political expression devolved into chaos (violent student demonstrations, etc.) the 
military was remarkably successful during each period of martial law in halting whatever 
momentum these movements had, at least in the electoral sense.  The first election after 
any period of martial law only ever consisted of a few parties, forming broadly along the 
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center-periphery dividing lines.  There would be a Kemalist party loyal to the state and its 
founding principles; and there would be one or two opposing parties forming out of very 
broad coalitions of seemingly unrelated interests groups – conservative Muslims and 
religious minorities, agrarian peasants and entrepreneurial urbanites, secular-nationalists 
and Neo-Ottomans alike.  While many of these groups have very different agendas, the 
organizational weakness of each group as its own electoral bloc and the frequency with 
which the state disestablished parties periodically forced these otherwise opposed pockets 
of voters into one ideologically-vacuous, often slightly right-of-center opposition party.  
Despite the fact that these opposition parties were often no more than a hodge-
podge of society's “periphery,” they almost always won the first election after a period of 
martial law.  In 1950, the Democrats won; in 1961 former Democrats won as a coalition 
between the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party; and in 1983 the center-right 
Motherland party won over the Kemalist People's Party.  The only exception to this trend 
occurred in 1973 when factional splits in both the center-right Justice Party and Kemalist 
Republican People's Party had weakened both parties so much that many otherwise 
insignificant parties were able to gain seats in parliament. (Magnarella [1998] 277). 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of center vs. periphery persists as a viable model for 
interpreting the Turkish political climate.  The legacy of organizational weakness which 
coups and fractional splits have yielded gives voters on the periphery few options other 
than forming broad, center-right coalition parties which unify a diverse set of constituents 
around opposition to Kemalism and the state, and not much more.
Islamic Political Engagement: 1960-1982
Hetzke 15
Turkey's Islamist religious-right did not have an independent electoral voice until 
the National Order Party was founded in 1970.  Up until that point, religiously minded 
right-wingers aligned themselves with the rest of the periphery and actively participated 
in many center-right parties like the Democrat Party.  Even after explicitly Islamist 
parties emerged, Center-right parties continued to pull support from the religious-right 
well into the 1990s.  National Order was the first of many Islamist parties to be led by 
Necmettin Erbakan and took the stance that Kemalism and Westernization hurt Turkey's 
national character, and that Turkey must now turn her gaze back towards the Muslim 
world and its traditions.  National Order was replaced in 1972 by the National Salvation 
Party, still under Erbakan's leadership. (Rabasa [2008], Özdalga [2002])
Erbakan began his career as a mechanical engineer; a successful academic having 
taught for 21 years at universities in Turkey and Germany, but an unsuccessful 
businessman having been a founding member of a failed motor factory in Istanbul.  It 
was, however, his experience in industry which first brought him into public life, and in 
1969 he was elected president of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Stock 
Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği – TOBB).  Erbakan had been 
an active member of TOBB for years, and became known in the organization as a strong 
critic of the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel (actually a former classmate of Erbakan). 
Erbakan's notoriety as a critic of Demirel's government prompted the government to 
cancel the TOBB election and use police force to physically remove Erbakan from his 
office which, in an act of defiance, he refused to leave peacefully.  Later that year, 
Erbakan was elected to parliament in the 1969 elections as an independent candidate, and 
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in January 1970 founded his first Islamist party, the National Order Party. (Özdalga 
[2002] 128-9).
Erbakan was well known for his religious piety, and during his time with TOBB in 
the mid-'60s he formed close relationships with members of a small, pious, and highly 
influential inner-circle of leadership within Demirel's center-right Justice Party.  After the 
1969 elections, this inner-circle became an emboldened opposition faction, which did not 
sit well with the rest of the party.  In 1971, a constitutional court closed the National 
Order Party on the grounds that it sought to create an Islamic state and was therefore a 
threat to the Republic; the court cited Erbakan's own speeches as evidence.  Erbakan, 
always one for dramatic public gestures, then left the country.  His influence, however, 
did not leave with him and the center-right remained in a state of bitter fragmentation. 
During Erbakan's “exile,” his associates founded the National Salvation Party in 1972, 
which Erbakan took leadership of when he returned to Turkey in 1973. In October, 1973, 
under Erbakan's leadership, National Salvation won over 11% of the vote.  Perhaps out of 
scorn for Demirel's own Justice Party, or simply emboldened by the opportunity a weak 
and fragmented right-wing presented, Erbakan surprised even those in his own party by 
agreeing to form a coalition with the Kemalist, Republican People's Party in 1973. 
(Özdalga [2002] 129-132).
Ideologically, this was a bold move.  Most pious Muslims could not fathom the 
idea of an alliance with such staunch secularists as the Republican People's Party; after 
all, this completely breaks the center-periphery model.  Nevertheless, the alliance 
between National Salvation and the Republican People's Party was made possible by 
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shared economic ideologies, namely, a belief shaped by anti-imperialist and pseudo-
socialist rhetoric that Turkey's future as a developed nation rested on a strong heavy-
industry sector.  Apart from this, the coalition had little common ground to stand on, and 
would become very unpopular with both voters and party-leadership.  The Republican 
People's Party were loyal to Kemalist principles, which also happened to be the very 
principles the Islamists thought would destroy Turkey.  Central to the Turkish-Islamist 
worldview in this period was the idea that Turkey had lost her moral character by 
abandoning her Islamic roots – issues related to public-prayer, Quran courses in public-
schools, etc. were of paramount importance to this first generation of Islamists (Özdalga 
[2002]).  Most Islamists could not support the decision to coalesce with the Republican 
People's Party, and so by the 1977 election, the National Salvation had lost the support 
needed to stay powerful in parliament.
Electorally, the Islamist movement pre-1980 can be described at its best times as a 
small but sufficient proportion of pious voters and politicians working to restore the 
nations moral compass; and at its worst times, the pre-1980 Islamist movement was 
disorganized and ideologically confusing, commanding only a small chunk of the 
conservative vote, but leaving a large portion of the pious citizenry in the arms of secular 
moderates like Demirel's Justice Party.  It is possible that Islam may have had a bigger 
influence on political opinion during this period than the electoral success of National 
Salvation Party would suggest, but the private leanings of individuals cannot be 
determined.  All we have to go by is how religion interfered with public life, and since 
public expression of Islam was suppressed by the state during much of this period, no 
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clear or very powerful Islamist ideology emerged.  Although Islam certainly had it's 
moments in the public eye during the 1970s, Islamic activism didn't really rise to 
prominence until the state began to loose control of religion in the 1980s. (Turam [2007] 
17-23).
Much like the political climate at large, the Islamist movement going into the 
military junta of 1980-82 was a disorganized and often confusing landscape.  Before the 
movement could affect any real change, the whole multi-party system would need to 
stabilize.  Parties' ideologies would need to become clearer and more coherent, and voters 
would need to begin to align themselves along less general lines than center or periphery.
A New Constitution and Beyond
The military coup of 1980, which established a period of martial law from 1980-
83 and gave the Republic a reformed constitution in 1982, is arguably the most 
significant period of authoritarian intervention since Atatürk himself ruled.  
The 1980 military regime had more far-reaching aims than those of 1960 and 1971 which 
went beyond the restructuring of the constitutional framework of the state...the 
Parliament and the government were dissolved, all political activities were banned and 
the leaders of four major political parties were put under custody...the first two executions 
since 1972 were carried out in October [1980; by '83 number had risen to 48]...Between 
September 1980 and February 1983 over 60,000 people suspected of terrorism and illegal 
political activities were arrested....All these aimed first to suppress the domestic 
opposition against the military intervention and then to re-form the whole political 
structure. (Dagi [1996] 125-6).
Military intervention was prompted by what the military viewed as an increasingly 
radical political climate, and most of the reforms from 1980-83 can be viewed as attempts 
to reduce the tendency of opposing factions (particularly devout Muslims) to radicalize. 
In many respects, the reforms were successful.  There has been no martial law since 
1983, and the field of parties participating in electoral politics has grown more diverse. 
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With a touch of irony, however, the diversity which emerged in the electoral system in the 
wake of stability also provided opportunities for some of the most polarizing political 
parties to not only participate, but win elections.  In this environment of relative stability, 
the Islamist movement took full shape, and ultimately rose to the highest offices in 
Turkish government.  The continuing development of the Islamist movement, as well as 
the eventual accession of the AKP, is discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter Three
The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of the Islamist Movement: 
A Brief History and Lit-Review – 1983-2002
Turkish party-politics since the constitutional reform of 1982 has been a volatile 
mix of alliance and ideology, with at least one major party changing leadership or name 
almost every election cycle.  Between 1987 and 2002, a span of only four election cycles, 
seven different parties held ruling positions in parliament,2 (Akarca [2008] 12), and 25 
different parties participated in elections.  Out of this volatility, the Islamist movement 
became the most powerful political force in the country, by far.  In 2002, the Islamist 
AKP won an unprecedented victory by becoming the first Islamist party to form a 
unilateral government in Turkish history, and the first party of any kind to form a 
unilateral government in the Motherland Party did so in 1983.  Since their accession, their 
popularity has only grown, as they have won almost 50% of the vote in the past two 
national parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011.  The goal of this chapter is to provide 
an overview of the Islamist movement in the last two decades of the twentieth century, as 
well as present five hypotheses scholars propose to explain the victory of the AKP in 
2002.  These five hypotheses form a basis for later analysis by providing conflicting 
narratives which can be tested empirically.
Rise, Fall and Resurrection: Islamists in the '90s
The period of military rule from 1980-82 disbanded every existing party and 
forced the entire electoral system to start fresh.  When multi-party democracy returned, 
2 All as participants of coalition governments
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only three, brand-new parties participated in the first election.  These three parties were 
ideologically vacuous, and formed more or less along lines of the center-vs-periphery 
framework.  While it is tempting to view this lack of ideological diversity as the natural 
outcome of initiating an election without affording much time for politicians to organize 
along clearer ideological lines, a much larger part of the story seems to be the fact that 
many of the most prominent and ideologically-divisive politicians of the 1970's were still 
tied up in court proceedings stemming from charges placed on them during the 1980 
coup; not the least of these was Necmettin Erbakan.  Without Erbakan's formal 
participation, the Welfare Party was formed in 1983, but did not participate in the election 
(Özdalga [2002] 132).
The Welfare Party participated in its first national election in 1987 receiving only 
7.17% of the vote, but by 1991 their share of votes had more than doubled.  By 1995, 
Welfare took first place in national elections, became the head of a coalition government 
with the relatively moderate True-Path Party, and Erbakan became prime minister.  A 
study by the RAND Corporation attributes Welfare's success in 1995 to superior 
organization, a large legion of devout Muslims loyal to the party, a move away from 
religious themes toward more general social issues, and a few populist slogans and 
proposals which drew votes from the urban poor away from the Republican People's 
Party (Rabasa [2008] 42-43).  Once in office, however, “Erbakan found it difficult to 
balance his anti-system campaign rhetoric with the need to consider the interest of the 
secular establishment, which was highly suspicious of his political goals.” (Rabasa 
[2008] 43) Trying to strike a balance, Erbakan not only failed to please his hard-core 
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Islamist base, but also lost the trust of the secularists in government which prompted the 
military to oust him.
On February 28, 1997, an office of state dominated by the military, the National 
Security Council, in conjunction with various actors within civil society, staged a “post-
modern” coup – military officials began a process which trapped Erbakan in a series of 
legal issues which forced him to resign in June that year, and by 1998, the Welfare Party 
was banned from politics (Çağlar [2010])  This became known as the  “February 28 
Process,” and revealed to many in Islamist leadership that power could not be maintained 
while mounting such an abrasive attack against secularism, Kemalism, and the status-
quo.  This sparked an internal debate within the party.  Leadership was fiercely divided 
between a group of traditional Islamists led by Erbakan, who felt obligated to stick to 
their guns on almost every issue, and a younger generation of reformers, led primarily by 
Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.  These reformers were willing to reconsider a 
variety of issues, but most notably human rights and relations with the West.  While the 
debate did not spark any immediate change (Welfare Party members still participated in 
the 1999 election under the banner of the Virtue Party), the party did formally split before 
the 2002 election into the AKP led by Erdoğan, and the Prosperity Party led unofficially 
by Erbakan.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended Sheikh Kotku's seminary at Iskanderpasa where 
he developed close ties with the Sufi brotherhood. (Rabasa [2008] 14)  As a district leader 
for the Welfare Party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected Mayor of Metropolitan Istanbul 
in 1994.  Though in many ways his mayoral administration was very successful, his term 
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in office ended prematurely in 1997 when he was arrested and imprisoned for reading an 
Islamic poem during a public address in Siirt. (“Biography” [2015]).  In 2001 he, along 
with his close associate Abdullah Gül, founded the AKP as a party dedicated to bringing 
Islamic conservatism into the modern world by rethinking certain issues. (Rabasa [2008] 
45).
The most striking difference between traditional Islamist parties and the AKP is 
the fact that the AKP “views and projects itself as a conservative democratic party” and 
not as an Islamic party (Akdoğan [2006]); although I will argue in a later chapter that 
saying the AKP is not an Islamist party is a false presupposition.  In terms of real policy 
changes, the AKP's most blatant break with its Islamist roots is expressed in its foreign 
policy, in particular, its attitudes towards the West.  The AKP has committed to pursuing 
membership in the European Union, and has made more advances in that process than 
any ruling party that preceded it.  This policy shift, perhaps more than any other 
“[succeeds] in challenging the Kemalist equation of urban with modern and secular, and 
rural with backward and Islamic.” (Kösebalaban [2011] 153; Hermann [2003])  The AKP 
maintains, however, many of the socially conservative policies of their Islamist 
predecessors, particularly in their not only relaxed attitude towards religious expression, 
but even occasional direct promotion of religious expression, in public life.  This is 
played out in policy reforms such as lifting the headscarf ban at public universities, and 
the insertion of Ottoman-script into the curriculum of public-schools. (Yengisu [2014]).
Although a great deal of scholarly work goes into analyzing the various policy 
positions of the AKP in order to determine what they stand for and represent (Akdoğan 
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[2006]), I believe the heart of this issue is understanding not what the AKP does with 
their power, but rather who they have won over by making those position changes.  In 
order to understand this, the 2002 election is key. 
Victory for the AKP: The 2002 Election
The 2002 election year was possibly the most pivotal moment in Turkish political 
history since the first free-elections were held in 1950.  Without a doubt, this election 
stands as the single most important achievement of the Islamist movement.  The AKP's 
victory in 2002 was not only the first time an Islamist party was able to form a unilateral 
(non-coalition) government, but also the first time since 1983 that any party was able to 
form a unilateral government.  It is hotly debate whether the AKP's victory is truly a 
victory for Islamism, or a victory made possible precisely because the AKP distanced 
themselves from their Islamist roots.  Therefore, understanding how the AKP came to 
power is critical to an understanding of the Islamist movement. 
Upon review of the existing work on the AKP's electoral success, I have identified 
five major factors which scholars speculate may have contributed to their rise:
• Crisis and Response – AKP victory was due to voters lashing out against 
incumbent parties for failed economic policies and corruption scandals
• Growing Nationalist Sentiment – AKP was well-received by a growing pocket of 
increasingly nationalistic voters.
• New Message, New Alliances – AKP successfully married Islamist social policy 
with more moderate stances on foreign and economic policy, and became the 
voice of not only Islamists, but Centrists as well.
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• Increasing Religious Piety – AKP was well-received by increasingly religious 
voters.
• Charismatic Leadership – AKP leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is an exceptionally 
charismatic figure, and simply won the hearts of the people.
Some scholars present a hypothesis which incorporates, in one way or another, all five 
factors.  Others may claim only one or two had any significant role in AKP accession. 
The remainder of this chapter will briefly discuss each hypothesis within existing 
scholarship and propose a few general empirical measures which could be used to test 
each one, respectively.
First Hypothesis: Crisis and Response
For most policy analysts and scholars, the Crisis and Response hypothesis is the 
most blatantly apparent.  Simply put, the Crisis and Response hypothesis states that the 
AKP's success is due to a few notorious failures of the incumbent, secular parties from 
1999-2001.  In particular, two crises often cited as grounds for outrage against 
incumbents are a financial crisis in 2001, and the aftermath of two earthquakes in 1999.
Devastating earthquakes occurred on August 17 and November 12, 1999, both in 
densely populated, heavily industrialized areas of northwestern Turkey.  As if tens of 
thousands of deaths and billions of dollars of damages were not enough scandal, the 
quakes brought years of corruption scandals into the public eye as news agencies reported 
on corrupt construction contractors and public inspectors (Akarca & Tansel [2008], 
Rabasa [2008], Green [2005]).  In early 2001, a series of banking and currency crises 
plunged the Turkish economy into recession, bringing GDP down by almost 5 percent in 
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the average province.
A great deal of scholarship already exists on the subject of how voters respond to 
macro-economic conditions.  In the literature on political forecasting and economic 
voting, scholars find that the economic performance under the incumbent government is 
weighed heavily in voter's decision making (Alvarez & Nagler [1998], Anderson [2000], 
Fair [1978], Kiewiet [1983] Lewis-Beck [1988]).  In Turkey, voters are found to respond 
almost exclusively retrospectively to economic conditions, which means that only the 
economic performance of the recent past has any meaningful effect on  a voter's decision-
making (Toros [2012], Başlevent, Kırmanoğlu, & Şenatalar [2005], Akarca and Tansel 
[2006]).  Ali T. Akarca and Aysit Tansel [2006] have gone so far as to build an empirical 
model for determining the vote shares received by the incumbent party in Turkey, which 
they claim accounts for 96% of the variation in votes for the incumbent party, in all 
elections held from 1950-2004.  Their model is based almost exclusively on economic 
factors, setting changes in income and price as independent variables which determine 
changes in voter support for the incumbent government.
Akarca and Tansel's results are very useful.  They determined that in almost every 
election in Turkey (1950-2004), the votes received by the incumbent majority party could 
be determined based only on the votes they received the previous year, and a few simple 
macro-economic indicators like inflation and GDP.  Their regressions did include, 
however, dummy variables during years they hypothesized certain outstanding events 
would impact voters opinions (like the capture of a notorious terrorist, etc.).  The only 
dummy variable found to be significant was the one for the 2002 election.  The 
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coefficient on this variable shows that the year the AKP came to power the incumbent 
party lost 18.61% of votes they would have otherwise received given the macroeconomic  
conditions. 
 Akarca and Tansel followed up on this study two years later with an analysis of 
the 2002 election in light of earthquake damage and financial crises.  Unlike the response 
to financial crisis, where voters tend not to look back beyond one year, the earthquakes 
brought to light major corruption scandals in construction codes at local and national 
government levels, which had been going on for years, and voters punished accordingly.
Our findings suggest that, in casting their ballots in 2002, the Turkish voters 
appear to have taken into account the performance of all governments that 
contributed to the magnification of the earthquake disasters.  Not just the 
incumbent parties at the time of the earthquakes but others, which were in power 
when the substandard buildings were actually built, were also held accountable. 
Each and every party which ruled during the 1983-1999 period was adversely 
affected by the earthquake damage. The votes lost by these parties went to the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP). (Akarca [2008] 8)
Provinces which were most heavily damaged by the earthquakes were the most likely to 
punish former governing parties with their ballots.
More than enough empirical evidence exists to connect the earthquakes of 1999 
and the economic crisis of 2001 to the failure of incumbent parties in 2002.  This 
evidence, however, only hints that the AKP was the direct beneficiary of public-outrage 
against incumbents.  Many non-incumbent parties participated in the 2002 election, and 
all could have benefited from public outrage. If the Crisis and Response hypothesis is 
true, in its fullest form, then the AKP would do very well in areas of the country most 
impacted by the 2001 financial crisis, and most sensitive to stories and scandals related to 
the earthquakes.  Chapters Four and Five address this hypothesis by collecting data and 
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estimating the success of the AKP in a province based on proximity to the earthquakes 
and the macro-economic effects of the financial crisis.
Hypothesis Two: Growing Nationalist Sentiments
A. Çarkoğlu (2002) imposes a right-wing vs. left-wing model in his evaluation of 
the 2002 election, and attributes the success of the AKP almost exclusively to the 
economic and nationalist factors.  Çarkoğlu's work operates on the basis that the AKP sits 
on the far-right, and that understanding their success requires understanding how the 
right-wing voting bloc grew prior to 2002.  He attributes to growth of the right-wing to 
growing nationalistic sentiment.  By mapping a shift in how voters self-identify on that 
spectrum using his own pre-election survey data, Çarkoğlu finds that from 1999-2002, 
the right-of-center faction of the electorate grew substantially, particularly in the areas 
most effected by the 2001 financial crisis.  In addition to the economic crisis, Çarkoğlu 
associates the growth of nationalist sentiment with the capture of PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan in 1999.
Simply put, the Growing Nationalist Sentiments hypothesis states that the AKP 
benefited from a growing, right-wing faction due to increasingly nationalistic feelings 
among voters.  Çarkoğlu cites his own survey data as evidence of increased nationalistic 
leanings, but perhaps additional support for this claim is the fact that the Nationalist 
Movement Party achieved more votes in the 1999 election than ever before, and actually 
won enough seats to participate in a coalition government.  If it can be demonstrated 
empirically that the Nationalist Movement voters of 1999 defected to the AKP in 2002 in 
significant numbers, then the Growing Nationalist Sentiments hypothesis must be taken 
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seriously.  Chapter five discusses this hypothesis further by demonstrating that the AKP 
does exceptionally well in provinces where voters favored the Nationalist Movement 
Party.
Hypothesis Three: New Message, New Alliances
The New Message, New Alliance hypothesis says that the AKP reworked the 
traditional Islamist platform and rhetoric to appeal to a broader constituency.  The 
changes in platform include a break from the anti-western/Eurosceptic policies of 
Islamist predecessors, and a re-branded form of social conservatism which appears less 
blatantly religious.  By making these changes, the AKP is thought to have won over 
voters in less traditional, urban communities.
The 1980s saw a rise in a new business class loyal to Islamist social projects. 
Mustafa Şen (2010) refers to the work of Karl Polanyi to explain how the transition to a 
market-economy and a society based on individualistic achievement and wealth 
maximization requires some kind of complimentary social movement.  In Turkey, 
“Islamists and religious brotherhoods have always had organic links with small and 
medium-sized business.” (Şen [2010] 71).  During Erdoğan's mayoral term in Istanbul, 
the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association, MŪSİAD, rose to 
prominence and developed close ties with future AKP leaders.  The organization 
represented over 10,000 firms, mostly new, small-business upstarts, and preached a new 
way to look at Islam which reconciled Islamic ethics with entrepreneurial achievement. 
The significance of new alliances with regard to AKP victory can be tested 
empirically with a few proxy measures for modernization and entrepreneurship.  The 
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New Message, New Alliance hypothesis will only be significant if the selected proxy 
variables are found to not only statistically significant determinants for AKP votes in the 
2002 election, but if an only if the 2002 election showed an above-average correlation 
between modernization and Islamist voting.  If modernization and entrepreneurship are 
found to be significant determinants for AKP votes in 2002, but not for Islamist voting 
overtime (say, for the Welfare Party), then there is a likelihood that the AKP's reformist-
Islamist stance got them elected.
Hypotheses Four: Increasing Religious-Piety
The fourth hypothesis, the Increasing Religious Piety hypothesis, states that for 
decades religious adherence and devotion had been increasing across Turkey, in particular 
a brand of Sunni-Islam which is not only moderate, but right in line with AKP ideology. 
Proponents of this hypothesis point to the fact that beginning in the 1970s, the state 
greatly expanded its expenditure on religious services and religious schooling.  Mustafa 
Şen writes that the state, by expanding its engagement in the religious field, participated 
in the dissemination of a particular brand of Sunni Islam throughout Turkey.  For Şen, 
official Qur'an courses and compulsory religious classes in primary and secondary 
schools resulted not only in a more religious population, but a less diverse religious 
population. (Şen [2010]).  For any observer, it seems like a natural fit that as voters 
became more religious they would vote for parties with more religious-oriented policies. 
Unfortunately, there are very few, if any, measures of religiosity which offer ways to 
meaningfully compare religiosity at the provincial level; the Turkish state does not keep 
track of religiosity, and other measures like World Values Survey do not provide 
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information at the provincial level. Therefore, the Increasing Religious Piety hypothesis 
must be left out of this study's empirical analysis.
Hypothesis Five: Charismatic Leadership
The Charismatic Leadership hypothesis states rather simply that Erdoğan's 
popularity translated to the AKP's popularity.  Former Istanbul Mayor,  Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, already had a name made for himself, and was an exceptional campaigner. 
Almost every scholar writing on the AKP's success gives kudos to their leader. (Hoşgōr 
[2008], Rabasa [2008], Findley [2010], Şen [2010], Bozkurt [2013]).  As a local 
politician, there is no way to  determine Erdoğan's popularity outside of Istanbul prior to 
2002.  Were he an aspiring parliamentarian in the past, his success at the polls could be of 
use, but alas, he was not.  The best proxy measurement for  Erdoğan's popularity is a 
relatively weak one, but may suffice.  Assuming that any local politician, even the mayor 
of a major city like Istanbul, is best known in the areas closest to his power base. 
Erdoğan's regional popularity may be considered if voters in and around Istanbul are 
more likely to vote for the AKP than voters in other regions.  This hypothesis is tested 
and discussed further in chapter five.
Conclusion
Understanding the AKP's victory in 2002, in terms of who voted them in, is 
crucial to understanding who they are and what they stand for.  While their unique 
mixture of traditional and progressive policy positions casts elements of uncertainty over 
understanding their constituency, it may be possible, through empirical analysis, to 
determine the characteristics of provinces where the AKP finds support for their new 
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brand of Islamism, and thereby better understand which of the five hypotheses just 
described is the most likely to be true.  In the following chapters, relevant measures are 
collected to test each hypothesis and the results of empirical testing are discussed.
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Chapter Four
Testing the Hypotheses for AKP Accession:
Data Collection and Voter-Aggregation
With the exception of a few empirical studies discussed in the previous chapter 
(Akarca & Tansel [2006 & 2008],  Çarkoğlu [2002]), most of the scholarly debate on 
AKP accession is built around qualitative evidence.  Going beyond the election, the 
debate on whether the AKP represents a progressive integration of Islam and politics or is 
a reactionary movement against modernization almost exclusively uses qualitative 
arguments.  Using only qualitative evidence, such as an analysis of policy positions, it is 
even difficult to assert beyond reproach that the AKP is an Islamist party.  A quantitative 
analysis, however, has the potential to settle many of these arguments.  The next two 
chapters cover empirical testing of the five hypotheses for AKP victory laid out in the last 
chapter.  The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how data were collected and organized, 
and why certain measures were chosen over others.
Collecting Election Results: Aggregating Votes
The results of elections are the most fundamental data points in determining 
changes in public opinion towards certain political policies.  Election results have been 
gathered from the Turkish Elections at the Provincial Level (TELP) data set produced by 
Güneş Murat Tezcür.3   TELP provides data for each national-level parliamentary election 
held from 1983-2011.  TEPL provides the total number of votes received by each party in 
3   Tezcür Güneş Murat. Turkish Elections at Province Level (TEPL) Dataset, 2012. Chicago. 10/21/14. 
Website: www.luc.edu/faculty/gtezcur/data.html
Hetzke 36
each of the 81 provinces in Turkey, as well as the total number of registered voters in a 
province, the total number of votes cast (and the total number of valid votes cast), voter 
turnout, the number of seats in a province, and the number of seats won by an individual 
party in an individual province.
Even with the thorough data provided by TEPL, trends are still very difficult to 
analyze.  The sheer number of parties which participate, and the year-to-year 
inconsistencies of that participation, makes the raw data appear to be a mess.  Not 
including independent candidates, 45 different parties participated in parliamentary 
elections from 1983-2011.  Table 4.1 displays the total number of parties participating in 
each election year.
The difficulty in analyzing this data is due, in large part, to the frequency which 
parties change names from one election year to the next.  As discussed in previous 
chapters, it is not uncommon in Turkish politics for a party to be banned from 
participating in elections, and for the leaders of those parties to quickly reorganize a 
“new” party with a new name.  In a great many of these cases, nominal changes are made 
without any change in ideology or even candidates (unless of course individual 
candidates happened to be banned from participation as well, as was the case with 
Necmettin Erbakan following his ousting from Premiership in 1998).  Therefore, the first 
level of simplification is to establish party-lineages  by determining which parties can be 
viewed as continuations of another a party.  Tezcür, the author of TEPL, provides this 
information in the code-book for TEPL.  Because the goal of this study is to find where 
the AKP fits within mainstream political discourse, the only party-lineages worth 
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analyzing are those which at some point become serious contenders for seats in 
parliament.  Figure 1 displays all party-lineages which, at some point from 1983-2002, 
win at least five-percent of the total national vote in at least one election year. 
It is worth noting that it is easier to treat Kurdish-nationalist parties as 
insignificant, even though they make up a lineage which in 2002 breaks 5% of the 
national vote.  The most important reason to treat this party-lineage as insignificant is 
because the party leaders often chose to support independent candidates rather than run 
their own, which makes trends almost impossible to analyze if the only measure is 
electoral success of the party.  It is also practical to remove the Kurdish-nationalist parties 
from a discussion of mainstream Turkish politics because the Kurdish-nationalist parties 
are only concerned with advocating for Kurdish independence and do not contribute in 
any meaningful way to the dialogue on issues every other party fights over (at least in the 
electoral sense).  And even without the Kurdish-nationalist party-lineage, the remaining 
significant party-lineages account for 87-99% of the total number of votes cast nationally 
(see Table 4.1).   
Even after insignificant parties are removed from the pool, and party-lineages 
have been established, ideological trends are still not entirely clear.  Many party-lineages 
share overlapping positions on a great number of issues, and can therefore be viewed as 
substitutes for one another by voters.  A voter can opt to vote for the Motherland Party in 
1987, and then vote for True-Path Party in 1991, without changing their personal 
ideology.  This poses a problem because this study is interested in changes in voter's 
ideologies and not just their preferences for certain parties or candidates.  It is possible to 
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address this problem by aggregating significant party-lineages into four distinct 
ideological camps.  These camps I have called Centrist, Kemalist, Islamist, and 
Nationalist.
The Centrist camp represents the classical perception of the periphery. Centrist 
parties are right-of-center, generally moderate, often appeal to conservative Muslims as 
well as religious minorities and the middle-class.  A major portion of their constituency 
traditionally comes from rural areas generally neglected by the Kemalist focus on urban 
industry.  The Kemalist camp represents Kemalists parties. these parties  generally have 
the most supporters within state bureaucracies, certainly the most support from within the 
military, and ideologically embody the founding principles of Kemalism (notably 
economic populism and lacite secularism).  The Islamist camp represents all offshoots of 
Necmettin Erbakan's welfare party, the policies of which are discussed in earlier chapters. 
The Nationalist camp represents a hyper-nationalist movement which emerges in large 
part due to rising ethnic violence between Turks and Kurds.  
The four ideological camps of Centrist, Kemalist, Islamist, and Nationalist 
represent the main actors in Turkish electoral politics.  Focusing only on these four 
camps, ideological trends are much easier to pick up on.  Figure 2 displays the share of 
the national vote each ideological camp receives from 1983-2011.
Some interesting trends to note are that the Kemalist camp fluctuates very little 
compared to the other three.  The vote-share of the Kemalist camp hovers, for the most 
part, between 20 and 30 percent, fitting with the idea that Kemalist's maintain a certain 
niche of loyal voters in specific segments of society.  What is most interesting is what 
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appears to be a direct trade between Islamists and Centrists.  The space which the Islamist 
come to occupy in 2002 crowds out the Centrists, which either means that the Islamist 
camp has absorbed Centrist voters, or the Centrists have given their support to other 
camps, independent candidates, or insignificant parties.  No matter what the case, the 
moderate-conservative, non-Islamist electoral wing that is the Centrist camp fades out of 
relevance after the accession of the AKP.
In order to go deeper than the national-level trends presented in Figure 2, the 
following variables were created to  analyze changes in voter's preferences at the 
provincial level:
• CenRVSt
• KemRVSt
• IslRVSt
• NatRVSt 
• AKPt
Each of these variables refers to the share of votes received by an ideological 
camp in a given province at time t.  In order to control for variation in turnout, the 
success of parties is measured in registered-vote-share, which refers to the total number 
of votes received divided by the total number of registered voters in a province.  The 
variable CenRVSt refers to the total number of votes going to significant Centrist parties 
divided by the number of registered voters, at time t; Significant Centrist parties include 
the lineages of Motherland Party, True-Path Party and the Young Party.  Using the same 
method of calculating real-vote-share, KemRVSt refers to votes going to the party-
lineages of Republican People's Party and the Democratic-Left Party; IslRVSt refers to 
votes going to the Welfare Party-lineage; and NatRVSt refers to votes going to the 
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Nationalist Movement Party-lineage.  AKPt refers to the real-vote-share received by the 
AKP in a given province at time t.  Summary statistics for these variables can be found in 
Table 4.2 in appendix.
Selecting Control Variables
Four variables were created to act as controls in each test.  This study, and each 
hypothesis, is only concerned with how the AKP grew the Islamist camp, so any latent 
tendencies for a province to vote for Islamist parties must be included in each estimation 
as a control variable.  To control for these tendencies, the variable IslAvgRVS90s was 
created by calculating the arithmetic mean of IslRVS from 1991-99.  
The second control has to do with nationalistic voting behavior.  Voters who live 
in parts of the country where ethnic tensions are high are likely to have different priorities 
at the polls.  In particular, Kurdish voters often vote exclusively for Kurdish-nationalist 
parties, or independent candidates.  These tendencies, however, are very difficult to 
quantify in real terms, especially when the Turkish Statistical Institute does not record 
population by ethnicity.  The best proxy measure for how concerned a province's voters 
are with issues related to nationalism seems to be the past success of hyper-nationalist 
parties.  Therefore, to control for voters' concern for nationalist issues, the variable 
NatAvgRVS90s was created by calculating the arithmetic mean of NatRVS from 1991-99.
Lastly, the Latitudinal and Longitudinal coordinates of each province's 
metropolitan center (each province is named for a metropolitan district, like Istanbul or 
Ankara) were collected by searching for each city on Google Maps.  This was done in 
order to control for any factors related to geographic location which have not been 
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identified, and yet may still be present.  The variables Lat.N and Long.E are defined as 
the coordinates of the center of each province's eponymous city in degrees North, and 
degrees East, respectively.
Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table 4.2 in appendix.
Selecting Crisis Variables.
Three independent variables were selected for use in tests narratives of the Crisis 
and Response Hypothesis, which link the AKP's success to a financial crash and two 
earthquakes.  The first of these variables was selected to capture the extent of the 
financial crisis.  Using data provided online by the Turkish Statistical Institute, the 
variable Crash was created by multiplying the provincial-level growth rate of real GDP 
per capita by negative-one.
To measure the effect of the earthquakes, the distance of a province's city-center 
to both the earthquakes' epicenters was calculated using latitude/longitude coordinates 
and the Pythagorean theorem.  Coordinates of city-centers were already collected, the 
epicenters of the two earthquakes were recorded by the U.S. Geological Survey.  The 
variable MinD_EQ was created by taking the minimum distance (in degrees 
latitude/longitude) of province's city center to one of the earthquakes.  Since very few 
provinces were actually touched by the earthquakes, but the political ramifications 
associated with widespread public knowledge of the events seem so large, distance is 
used rather than any alternative measures.  Distance is selected of the assumption that 
voters who live closer to the provinces effected by the quakes are more sensitive to the 
issues that come to light in the wake of the quakes.  It should be noted that there is a 
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slight amount of error in calculating distance in degrees latitude/longitude, but given 
Turkey only spans six degrees north to south, and is fairly close to the equator, the error is 
not large enough to significantly distort estimations of general trends.
The third variable used in testing the crisis and response hypothesis is the share of 
votes received by the incumbents in the previous election.  If incumbents are being 
punished for these crises, then the effects of the crises on voting patterns should be 
stronger among voters who actually voted for them in the past, and then changed their 
minds.  The variables Inc99 was created to account for the total share of votes incumbent 
parties received in 1999; this variable is defined as the sum percentage of the vote in 
1999 which went to the Nationalist Movement Party and the Democratic-Left Party. 
Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table 4.2 in appendix.
Selecting New Messages, New Alliance Variables
In order to test the New Messages, New Alliance hypothesis, four variables were 
selected to measure modernization, and five others were selected to measure level of 
interest in certain foreign policy goals.  Measures of modernization were selected to test 
the narrative which says that the AKP successfully challenged the public perception of 
Islamism as rural and backwards, and thereby gained support from modern urbanites.  All 
four modernization variables were created using data from the year 2000 General 
Population Census provided online by the Turkish Statistical Institute.  These four 
variables are URB, EDU, WOM, and ENT.  
URB refers to Urbanization Rate, and is defined as the percent of the population 
living in an urban setting, as opposed to village setting.  EDU refers to Education, and is 
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defined as the percent of the population with a non-vocational high school education or 
greater.  WOM refers to Women in the workforce, and is defined as the percent of women 
in the non-agricultural workforce.  Finally, the variable ENT refers to Entrepreneurship, 
and was created to directly test the aspect of the New Messages-New Alliances 
hypothesis which says that AKP leadership developed close ties with an emerging class 
of Muslim entrepreneurs.  ENT is defined as the percent of the workforce listed as either 
“self-employed” or “employer.”  
The five other variables created to test the New Messages-New Alliances 
hypothesis were selected to serve as loose proxies for level of interest in certain foreign 
policy goals.  The first variable, Number of Container Ports, was selected as an 
approximate measure for a provinces stake in international trade.  Only four container 
ports operate in Turkey in three provinces, one in Mersin, one in Izmir, and two in 
Istanbul.  About 40% of Turkish imports and exports pass through these container ports. 
This data was collected from a powerpoint-presentation delvered by Hakan Erdogan, a 
Port Expert in the Turkish State Railways Ports Department, at a Seaports Conference 
hosted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in 2008.  The remaining 
four variables, Border, Ext. Coast, Int. Coast, and Asian Border, are all dummy-variables 
which receive a value of 1 if a province fits the geographic description connoted by the 
name and a value of 0 if otherwise.  Border refers to any province, coastal or landlocked, 
which sits on a the edge of the country, while not referring to interior provinces on the 
Sea of Marmara.  Ext. Coast refers to any province sitting on the Black Sea or 
Mediterranean Sea.  Int. Coast refers to provinces sitting on the Sea of Marmara, and 
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Asian Border refers to land-locked provinces sitting on a border with an Asian country 
like Iraq or Syria.  Since a major break the AKP makes with their Islamist roots is in their 
policy towards the European Union, these dummy variables were created to see whether 
provinces more likely to come in contact with Europe (via the Mediterranean) were now 
more likely to vote for the AKP.
Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table 4.2 in appendix.
Selecting Charismatic Leadership Variables
To test the Charismatic Leadership Hypothesis, each province's distance to 
Istanbul was calculated in degrees latitude/longitude using the Pythagorean theorem, and 
a dummy-variable was created that received a value of 1 if the province was Istanbul, and 
zero if otherwise.  Distance to Istanbul is included on the assumption that voters are more 
aware of local politicians in neighboring provinces than in provinces far away, so if 
Erdoğan's local/regional popularity had any meaningful impact on the election, then 
provinces closer to Istanbul would be more likely to vote for the AKP.  The dummy-
variable was included to test if Istanbul voters gave any additional support to the AKP.
Table 4.2 displays summary statistics for all variables used in regression analysis, 
while  Table 4.3 displays definitions for all variables.
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Chapter Five
How Justice and Development Came to Power:
Empirical Results
Using the data collected in the previous chapter, four separate rounds of 
regression analysis were conducted to test the merits of various aspects of the Crisis and 
Response hypothesis, the Growing Nationalist Sentiments hypothesis, the New 
Messages-New Alliances hypothesis, and the Charismatic Leadership hypothesis.  The 
empirical evidence, once analyzed, affirmed the Growing Nationalist Sentiments and 
Crisis and response hypotheses, while exposed weaknesses in the New Messages-New 
Alliances and Charismatic Leadership hypotheses.  This chapter highlights the findings of 
those four rounds of regression analysis.  
First, the 2002 election is analyzed on the basis of competition between 
ideological camps.  Second, the Crisis and Response hypothesis is tested using GDP 
figures and distance from the earthquakes.   Third, the New Messages-New Alliances 
hypothesis is tested using various modernization variables, as well as geographic dummy 
variables. Finally, the Charismatic Leadership hypotheses is tested using distance to 
Istanbul as a metric for Erdoğan's regional popularity.
Basic Party-Competition Regression Analysis
  The first round of analysis was conducted using election-results as data points, 
not to test any individual hypothesis, but in order to attain a better understanding of 
which parties (or ideological camps) retained their constituents, and which ones lost 
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them.  Using an Ordinary Least Squares regression model, the provincial-level electoral 
success of the party, or ideological camp, in 2002 was estimated as a function of the 
provincial-level electoral success of the four main ideological camps in 1999.4
This regression was run five times, with the dependent variables AKP02, Prosperity02,  
CenRVS02, KemRVS02, and NatRVS02. The results of all five regression estimations are 
shown in Table 5.1.
These regressions simultaneously confirm and undermine the conservative-but-
not-Islamic narrative, which attributes the AKP's success to appearing to distance 
themselves from Islamist roots by creating a separate, conservative identity prior to the 
2002 election.  The narrative is confirmed because these regressions demonstrate that the 
AKP drew supporters from every ideological camp.  Each independent variable under 
AKP02  has a coefficient that is both positive and significant – the coefficient on NatRVS99 
demonstrates that about 57% of voters in the Nationalist camp in 1999 voted for the AKP 
in 2002, and that about 26% of Kemalist voters and 25% of Centrist voters also voted for 
the AKP.  
These regressions undermine the conservative-but-not-Islamic narrative because 
they show that the explanatory power of the narrative can be overstated.  Perhaps the 
most important conclusion that can be drawn from Table 5.1 is that the AKP, despite 
claiming to be secular conservative-democrats, is actually an Islamist party.  If Turkish 
voters believed that the AKP was not an Islamist party, then we would expect Islamist 
4 As discussed in the previous chapter, provincial-level electoral success is measured in registered vote-
share
Party02=α+β1 IslRVS 99+β2 CenRVS 99+β3 KemRVS 99+β4 NatRVS 99
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voters to be less likely to vote for them, but this expectation is contrary to the empirical 
evidence.  The coefficient estimated for IslRVS99 when AKP02 is the dependent variable is 
largest positive coefficient on Table 5.1, by far, indicating that 1999's Islamist voters 
supported the AKP more than any other party.  By contrast, the coefficient on IslRVS99 
under Prosperity02 indicates that the more traditional Prosperity Party only retained a 
miniscule portion of the Islamist vote.
The explanatory power of the conservative-but-not-Islamic narrative is further 
undermined when we realize that the Centrist camp not only gave the least support to the 
AKP proportionally, but also contributed the fewest actual votes.  57% of 1999's 
Nationalist vote translates to about 9.17% of the national-vote given to the AKP, while 
26% of the Kemalist vote is about 5.62% of the national vote and 25% of the Centrist 
vote is only about 4.44% of the national vote.5  
Another, perhaps equally significant conclusion, that can be drawn from these 
party-competition regressions is that the AKP was the only party to compete with the 
Nationalist camp for hyper-nationalistic voters.  Other than from the Islamist camp, the 
AKP drew the most support from the Nationalist camp, as evidenced by the coefficient on 
NatRVS99 under AKP02.  The Nationalist camp was the only camp to lose more votes to 
the AKP than they retained for themselves.  This exactly fits the narrative presented in the 
Growing Nationalist Sentiment hypothesis, which states that the AKP's victory is the 
result of the party grabbing support from growing bloc of right-wing nationalists.
It is also interesting to note that competition for the Nationalist vote occurs only 
5 National-vote estimated by multiplying a variable's mean [see summary statistics] by its coefficient under 
AKP02
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between the AKP and the Nationalists.  Neither Centrist nor Kemalist parties are stealing 
significant numbers of votes from the Nationalists, and Nationalist parties are not stealing 
votes from either the Centrist or the Kemalist parties.  This is evidenced by the fact that 
coefficients on NatRVS99 are both small and insignificant when either CenRVS02 or 
KemRVS02  is set as the dependent variable, and by the fact that coefficients on both 
CenRVS99 and KemRVS99 are even smaller and less significant when NatRVS02 is set as the 
dependent variable.  NatRVS99 has a sizable and significant coefficient when NatRVS02 is 
set as the dependent variable, and the coefficient is even bigger when AKP02 is set as the 
dependent variable.  This all implies that competition for Nationalist voters, which 
represent the hyper-nationalistic voting bloc, occurred only between the AKP and the 
Nationalist camp.  Therefore, the Growing Nationalist Sentiment hypothesis is 
strengthened.
Finally, these regressions hint at the beginnings of the Centrist constituency fading 
into obscurity.  Taking all five regressions together, we see the Islamist, Kemalist, and 
Nationalist voters from 1999 being distributed across the four main ideological camps. 
Adding horizontally across Table 5.1, the sum of all five coefficients on IslRVS99, as well 
as KemRVS99 and NatRVS99, is about equal to one.  This suggests that Islamist, Kemalist, 
and Nationalist voters of 1999 stayed within the four main ideological camps when they 
cast their ballots in 2002.  The sum of the five coefficients on CenRVS99, however, only 
amounts to about 0.77, which implies that almost 25% of 1999's Centrist voters switched 
over to either insignificant parties or independent candidates 2002.  
This is not an insignificant change.  A quick glance at Figure 4 in the previous 
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chapter shows that by 2011, significant Centrist parties are non-existent.  This would not 
be a problem for Centrist voters if the AKP was a suitable substitute, but as has already 
been discussed, Centrist voters were the least likely of the four ideological camps to vote 
for the AKP in 2002.  The AKP does not appear to be absorbing Centrists into their 
constituency, but is winning in spite of them, and crowding out the electoral space. 
Islamism seems to have replaced, rather than absorbed the more moderate conservatism 
of the Centrists, which is a major paradigm shift away from center-vs-periphery, where 
Centrists used to represented the majority of the opposition to Kemalism.
Crisis and Response Regression Analysis
The second round of regressions was conducted to test the Crisis and Response 
hypothesis.  In this round, six OLS regressions were estimated, each setting AKP02  as the 
dependent variable.  The first regression estimated  AKP02  as a function dependent only 
on the four controls described in the previous chapter.
Regression II adds Crash as an independent variable, in order to test whether or not the 
financial crisis, on its own, had any effect on AKP success.  In regression III, Inc99 is 
added along with the interaction term Crash*Inc99 in order to test whether or not the 
political-effects of the financial crash are related to how large a vote-share the incumbent 
parties won in the previous election year – the hypothesis being that if more votes went to 
incumbents who were blamed for the financial crash, then there would be more votes 
available for the AKP to steal in the election.  Regression IV estimated  AKP02  as just a 
function of distance to the earthquakes and controls, and regression V added  Inc99  along 
AKP 02=α+β1 IslAvgRVS 90s+β2 NatAvgRVS 90s+β3 Latitude.N +β4 Longitude.E
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with the interaction term MinD_EQ*Inc99 for the same reasons as regression III.  The 
sixth and final regression combined all of these variables together, and is displayed 
below.
Table 5.2 records the results of these estimations.
There are no shocking revelations from regression I, which used only controls, but 
it is nice to see that all of the coefficients are significant.  The coefficient on IslAvgRVS90s 
reveals a close to 1:1 ratio between votes received by Islamists in the past and votes 
received by the AKP.  Similarly, the coefficient on NatAvgRVS90s reveals that about 70% 
of the past hyper-nationalistic votes went to the AKP.  The fact that the coefficients on 
Latitude.N and Longitude.E are significant reveals that geographic location has 
something to do with the success of the AKP, although what that is remains unclear. 
Regression II, Crash on its own, seems to reveal that the AKP did not benefit at 
all from financial crisis, as the coefficient on Crash is small and highly-insignificant. 
Regression III, however, tells a much more interesting story.  The coefficients in 
regression III on Crash and Crash*Inc99 are significant, and very informative, but must 
be understood in terms of partial derivatives.  Figure 1 displays these coefficients 
interpreted as a partial derivative.
 
These coefficients reveal that for every percentage point decline in GDP growth, 
the AKP increased their share of the vote by about 0.655 percentage points, but for every 
∂ AKP02
∂Crash
= 0.655355 − 0.0205077∗Inc99
Figure 1: Interpreting Coefficients
AKP 02=α+β1 IslAvgRVS 90s+β2 NatAvgRVS 90s+β3 Latitude.N+β4 Longitude.E
+γ1 Crash+γ2(Crash∗Inc99)+γ3 MinD_EQ+γ4(MinD_EQ∗Inc99)+γ5 Inc 99
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percentage point increase in Inc99, that 0.655 percentage point bump declines by about 
0.02 percentage points.  This means that the financial crash only had a positive effect on 
AKP success in provinces where the incumbent's vote-share was less than 31.94 percent, 
which also means that the financial crisis had a negative effect on AKP success in 47 
provinces, just more than half of the country.  Because the mean of Inc99 is 30.455 
percent, the average effect of the financial crash was only a 0.03 percentage point bump 
in registered vote-share for the AKP for every 1.0 percentage point decline in real GDP – 
essentially no effect.  This explains why in regression II to coefficient on Crash was 
highly insignificant (with a p-value of 0.92).  That coefficient was insignificant, not 
because the financial crisis had no effect on voters, but because in the average province, 
the effects of the crash were almost completely negated by the existing popularity of the 
incumbent parties
Regression IV, quakes alone, reveals that the earthquakes benefited the AKP on 
their own right.  The coefficient on MinD_EQ was negative and significant, revealing that 
for every degree away from the closest earthquake's epicenter, the AKP lost 1.93 
percentage points of the vote-share. It is also interesting to note that when MinD_EQ is 
included in a regression, the significance of the coefficients on the controls Latitude.N 
and Longitude.E disappears, implying that geographic location is only a relevant 
determinant for AKP success so far as it captures proximity to the earthquakes.
When the interaction term MinD_EQ*Inc99 is inserted into the regression V, the 
effects of the earthquakes are even more pronounced.   For every degree of distance 
between a province and an earthquake epicenter, the AKP loses 3.2 percentage points of 
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the registered vote-share, but for every 1 percent increase in incumbent registered vote-
share, that 3.2 percentage point drop declines by 0.044 percentage points.  This means 
that the share of votes going to incumbent parties in 1999 would have to be about 73% to 
completely negate the effects of the earthquakes – far higher than the maximum value for 
Inc99, which is 47.988.  Therefor, the earthquake crises had a positive effect on AKP 
success in every province, with the average effect being that for every degree of distance 
from the closest epicenter, the registered vote-share received by the AKP declines by 1.87 
percentage points.  The province furthest away from the earthquakes, Hakkari at 12.558 
degrees, would give 23.48 percentage points fewer of votes to the AKP than a province 
right on top of the earthquakes, holding incumbent vote-share and controls constant.
Even with the affirmation that the earthquakes played a major role in the election, it is 
perhaps even more important to affirm that the effect of the quakes was still diminished 
by the the popularity of incumbent parties in the previous election.  
The most significant conclusion that can be drawn from these regressions is that 
the AKP benefited the most from the two crises in areas where incumbents were already 
unpopular.  Because each regression controlled for latent tendencies to vote for Islamist 
parties, we can say that the crises created room for the AKP to grow the Islamist camp, 
but we cannot say that the AKP stole the most votes from incumbent parties.  It is even 
still possible (even probable) that the incumbents lost a great deal of votes due to the 
crises, but they did not necessarily lose those votes to the AKP.   
New Messages, New Alliances Regression Analysis
As discussed in the previous chapter, data was collected to test two aspects of the 
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New Messages, New Alliances hypothesis; those aspects being modernization and 
internationalization.  In order to test the modernization aspect of the New Messages, New 
Alliances hypothesis, AKP success was estimated as a function of controls and various 
measures of modernization.  Five separate regressions were estimated using the equation 
displayed below: four regression where each modernization variable was tested 
individually, and one where all variables were included.  
The results of these regressions are displayed in Table 5.3.
In the first three regressions, not one of the modernization variables had a 
significant coefficient.  When controlling for latent Islamist and Nationalistic tendencies, 
neither urbanization, nor education, nor gender progressivism had any correlation, 
positive or negative, with AKP success.  The fourth regression did produce a significant 
coefficient on Entrepreneurship, but that coefficient was negative, which provides 
contrary evidence to the hypothesis that part of the AKP's success is due to ties with a 
growing class of Muslim entrepreneurs.  The fifth regression affirms the insignificance of 
urbanization, education, and women in non-agricultural work, as well as affirming the 
negative significance of entrepreneurship. 
To test the internationalization component of the New Messages-New Alliances 
hypothesis, four regressions were estimating using dummy-variables which distinguished 
between border provinces and interior provinces.  In the first regression, the only 
variables included are Border and Int. Coast. In the second, to distinguish between land-
locked border provinces (all of which happen to border Asian states) and coastal border 
AKP 02=α+β1 IslAvgRVS 90s+β2 NatAvgRVS 90s+β3 Latitude.N+β4 Longitude.E
+ γ1 ModernizationVariable
Hetzke 54
provinces, Border is left out of the regression in favor of Ext. Coast and Asian Border. In 
the third regression, Number of Container Ports is added to control for which coastal 
provinces are the largest trading hubs.  Finally, in the fourth regression, Number of  
Container Ports is estimated as a lone, non-control variable.  The results of these four 
regressions are displayed in Table 5.4.
Not one geographic dummy-variable bears a significant coefficient, which 
provides, at best, very weak evidence to suggest that the AKP's foreign policy played an 
insignificant role in their election.  The only conclusion that can be definitively drawn 
from these insignificant coefficients is that whether or not a province falls on a border or 
a coast is not a meaningful indicator of voting trends.  More, however, can be reasonably 
deduced from the insignificance of the coefficients on Number of Container Ports in 
regressions III and IV.  The number of container ports in a province is a very real measure 
for the amount of international trade which passes through that province compared to 
another.  If these provinces with the most trade don't alter their preferences for the AKP, 
then it provides stronger evidence to suggest that the AKP's foreign-trade policy was not 
a significant factor in voter's decision-making.  The safest conclusion, although, is to say 
the from these regressions, no evidence exists to affirm the New Messages-New Alliances 
hypothesis.
Upon review of the modernization and internationalization test regressions just 
presented, it is safe to say that New Messages-New Alliances hypothesis has no 
grounding in the empirical evidence presented thus far.  The idea that the AKP won by 
differentiating themselves from previous Islamist parties as more modern and forward 
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thinking, and thereby winning the votes of more-educated urbanites and entrepreneurs, 
cannot be affirmed with by these regressions.  This is not to say that some individual 
voters did not find the AKP's message more modern, but the “modernness” of their 
message cannot be considered a driving force behind their victory when not one of the 
variables selected for modernization or internationalization was estimated to have had 
both significant and positive effects on the AKP's success.
Charismatic Leadership Hypothesis Analysis
 To test the Charismatic Leadership hypothesis, the possibility that Erdoğan had 
cultivated a regional popularity as mayor of Istanbul was tested by estimating  AKP02  as a 
function dependent on D_Istanbul (distance to Istanbul, in degrees), Istanbul (a dummy-
variable for Istanbul to pick up any favorite-son voting), and controls.  
A second regression was estimated, this time adding MinD_EQ to make sure that 
D_Istanbul wasn't being estimated as significant because Istanbul is relatively close to 
both epicenters.  The results of these estimations are displayed in Table 5.5.
In the first estimate, the coefficient on D_Istanbul seems to support the possibility 
that Erdoğan's regional popularity played a role in AKP success.  The second estimation, 
however, nullifies this possibility.  When MinD_EQ is included, all the variables become 
insignificant, which implies that the significance of the coefficient on D_Istanbul in the 
first estimation was only piggy-backing off the already proven to be significant effects of 
the earthquakes.  Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that  Erdoğan's regional 
AKP 02=α+β1 IslAvgRVS 90s+β2 NatAvgRVS 90s+β3 Latitude.N+β4 Longitude.E
+ γ1 D_Istanbul+γ2 Istanbul
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popularity played a meaningful role in the election of the AKP in 2002.
Conclusion
Based on the empirical evidence, the strongest hypotheses are the Crisis and 
Response hypothesis and the Growing Nationalist Sentiment hypothesis.  By contrast, the 
New Messages-New Alliances and Charismatic Leadership hypotheses are found to be 
very weak in terms of explanatory power.  The fact that the Crisis and Response 
hypothesis was found to be most significant when using interaction terms to control for 
the incumbent's vote-share demonstrates that while many voters did in fact respond to the 
crises with positive attitudes toward the AKP, voters who most strongly supported the 
incumbent parties were unlikely to switch to the AKP.  This suggests that ideology 
remained a significant force in a voter's mind when bread-and-butter issues like economic 
recession forced voters away from incumbent parties.  The relative strength of the 
Growing Nationalist Sentiment over and against the New Messages-New Alliances 
hypothesis (and even the Charismatic Leadership hypothesis) suggests that Turkish 
voter's were already moving toward a more conservative, nationalistic ideology embodied 
by the AKP, and not that the AKP was moving to the center to meet Turkish voters.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
The goal of this project is to determine, through an analysis of how the AKP came 
to power, whether the success of the AKP should be viewed as Islamist actors moving 
toward the center to accommodate a modernizing electorate, or as an electorate becoming 
more traditional and thereby choosing to vote for a conservative, Islamist party.  Strictly 
qualitative analysis is insufficient to answer this question, as ample material exists for 
interested observers to write history around either side of the question – on the one hand, 
the AKP's policies on issues like European Union membership are much more moderate 
than Islamist predecessors, while on the other, the role of religion in public life seems to 
be increasing.  The empirical study presented in the previous chapters was undertaken to 
engage with competing explanations found in existing scholarship for the AKP's success.
This thesis finds that the AKP should not be viewed as an example of conservative 
Islam adapting to become compatible in an increasingly liberal democracy, but should 
rather be viewed as an example of an electorate become more conservative and more 
receptive to the Islamist message.
Upon review of existing scholarship, five hypotheses were identified as narratives 
which explain how the AKP came to power, although only four of these hypotheses were 
tested through empirical analysis.  The four tested were called the Crisis and Response 
hypothesis, the Growing Nationalist Sentiment hypothesis, the New Messages-New 
Alliances hypothesis, and the Charismatic Leadership hypothesis.  The Crisis and 
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Response and Charismatic Leadership hypotheses both offer an explanation which 
minimizes the influence of ideological trends.  In these hypotheses, bread-and-butter 
issues and clever campaigning explain why the AKP won, not ideological shifts by either 
Islamist politicians or the electorate.  The Growing Nationalist Sentiment hypothesis rests 
on the idea that the electorate was changing their ideology, and the New Messages-New 
Alliances hypothesis suggests that the AKP changed their ideology to meet the electorate. 
Based on the empirical evidence, the strongest hypotheses are the Crisis and 
Response hypothesis and the Growing Nationalist Sentiment hypothesis, while the New 
Messages-New Alliances and Charismatic Leadership hypotheses appear much weaker.  
The strength of the Growing Nationalist Sentiment hypothesis is affirmed by 
finding strong correlations between votes for the Nationalist Movement Party from 1991-
1999 and votes for the AKP in 2002.  This correlation is evidenced by the fact that in 
nearly all regression estimations the variable NatAvgRVS90s was found to have positive 
and significant coefficients.  The first round of regressions presents the most significant 
empirical evidence for the strength of this hypothesis, by demonstrating that not only was 
the AKP winning over almost 60% of the Nationalist camp, but was also found to be the 
only party in serious competition with the Nationalist camp for hyper-nationalistic voters. 
The strength of the Crisis and Response hypothesis is affirmed, but the results of 
the second round of regressions suggest that ideological factors significantly limited the 
effects of the crises.  The AKP did in fact benefit from the earthquakes and the financial 
crash, but the benefits of the earthquakes were significantly tapered, and the effects of the 
financial crash completely washed out, by the popularity of incumbents in the previous 
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year.  Provinces which voted for incumbent parties in the previous year were less likely to 
be convinced to vote for the AKP on account of the earthquakes or financial crisis, which 
suggests that ideological convictions were, in many instances, stronger than the bread-
and-butter issues exposed by the crises.
The New Messages-New Alliances hypothesis, and the Charismatic Leadership 
hypothesis, are revealed to be weak in terms of explanatory power.  The narratives 
presented in the New Messages-New Alliances hypothesis are not necessarily false – the 
first round of regressions did demonstrate that meaningful portions of voters from each 
ideological camp did vote for the AKP – but the insignificance of modernization and 
internationalization variables suggests that voters who changed their minds based on the 
AKP's reformist attitude toward traditional Islamism were not so numerous as to have a 
meaningful impact on the outcome of the election.  Additionally, the insignificance of 
coefficients on the variable Istanbul suggests that Istanbul residents were not more or less 
likely to vote for the AKP, which weakens the Charismatic Leadership hypothesis. 
Again, none of the narratives presented in these hypotheses are falsified, but the 
empirical evidence suggests that these narratives do not represent a big enough part of the 
picture to explain why the AKP won – the AKP could very well have attracted new types 
of voters with their newer messages, but not enough to explain why they won the 
election.
In sum, the biggest contribution to the AKP's 2002 victory appears to be 
ideological shifts within the electorate, which were partially influenced by the 
discrediting of incumbent parties after 1999's earthquakes, towards religious 
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conservatism and hyper-nationalism.  Whatever actions the AKP took to appear less-
Islamist should not be interpreted as actions taken to please the electorate, because these 
actions do not appear to have contributed meaningfully to the election. The AKP drew the 
most support from traditionally Islamist voters and hyper-nationalistic voters, and very 
little support from the secular center-right (Centrists).  The disappearance of significant 
Centrist parties after the 2002 election should not be viewed as the AKP having absorbed 
the secular center-right into its own constituency, but rather as having crowded out the 
Centrists by absorbing only about 25% of their voters while forcing the rest to vote for 
insignificant parties or independent candidates.  Taking all these things together, it is not 
right to say that the AKP is an example, at the electoral level, of conservative Islam 
adapting to liberal democracy, but rather a semi-liberal democracy adapting to become 
more accepting of conservative Islam as a political force.  
Whether or not Turkey can still be called “the model” for reconciling Islam and 
democracy remains to be seen.  While the AKP's accession should be viewed as evidence 
of major changes within the Turkish electorate, those changes to not carry any inherent 
threats to the democratic process.  This project has not examined in detail anything that 
has happened since 2002, but even if religion has become a more powerful aspect of 
public life and political discourse under the AKP, there are still no major threats 
democratic process.  The true test of whether AKP Islamism and semi-liberal democracy 
can coexist will come when the AKP is in serious danger of losing an election, which 
remains to be observed and discussed.  Despite the fact that Turkish voters have become 
more receptive to Islamism, Turkey may still very well be the best case-study for 
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reconciling Islam and democracy.  Turkey is still the only thing close to liberal 
democracy in the Islamic Middle East, and as such deserves all of the scholarly attention 
it has already been given.
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Basic Election Information
1983 4 3 98.53
1987 8 6 98.81
1991 7 5 99.42
1995 13 6 93.69
1999 21 6 89.53
2002 19 8 87.65
Election  
Year
Number of 
Parties 
Which 
Participate
Number of 
Significant 
Parties
Percent of 
National Vote 
Going to 
Significant 
Parties
* Number of parties which participate   
includes independents as one party
** In this figure, Kurdish-nationalist parties are 
not included as significant
Figure 4.1: Graphic Outline of Party Lineages within Ideological Camps
Year Centrist Parties Kemalist Parties Islamist Parties Nationalist Parties
1983 Motherland P. Nat. Dem. P. People's P.
|| ||
1987 Motherland P. True-Path P. Socialist People's P. Democratic-Left P. Welfare P. Nat. Work P.
|| || || || || ||
1991 Motherland P. True-Path P. Socialist People's P. Democratic-Left P. Welfare P. dnp
|| || || || || ||
1995 Motherland P. True-Path P. Republican People's P. Democratic-Left P. Welfare P. Nat. Movement P.
|| || || || || ||
1999 Motherland P. True-Path P. Republican People's P. Democratic-Left P. Virtue P. Nat. Movement P.
|| || || || // \\ ||
2002 Motherland P. True-Path P. Young P. Republican People's P. Democratic-Left P. AKP Prosperity P. Nat. Movement P.
*
** Two horizontal lines indicate a party-lineage has ended
Abbreviations: P. = Party ; Nat. = National (or Nationalist) ; Dem. = Democratic ; dnp means a lineage did not participate in that election year
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Table 4.2: Definitions of All Variables
Variable Definition
In 2002; Total Number of votes going to the AKP / Number of registered voters
In 2002; Total Number of votes going to the Prosperity Party / Number of registered voters
In 2002; Total Number of votes going to Centrist parties / Number of registered voters
In 2002; Total Number of votes going to Kemalist parties / Number of registered voters
In 2002; Total Number of votes going to the Nationalist / Number of registered voters
In 1999; Total Number of votes going to Islamist parties / Number of registered voters
In 1999; Total Number of votes going to Centrist parties / Number of registered voters
In 1999; Total Number of votes going to Kemalist parties / Number of registered voters
In 1999; Total Number of votes going to the Nationalist / Number of registered voters
Average share of registered voters voting for Islamist parties in the three elections from 1991-1999
Average share of registered voters voting for Fascist parties in the three elections from 1991-1999
Latitude.N Coordinate, Latitude North
Longitude.E Coordinate, Longitude East
Crash Negative Growth in per capita GDP in 2001 
MinD_EQ Minimum distance, in degrees, from a 1999 earthquake epicenter
In 1999; Total Number of votes going to Incumbent Parties / Number of registered voters
URB Population living in an urban setting / Total population
EDU Population with a non-vocational high-school education, or greater / Total population
WOM Number of women employed in the non-agricultural workforce / Total female population
ENT Total number of workers listed as either “self-employed” or “employer” / Total workforce
Border Dummy: value of 1 if provinces is a border or exterior coastal province, 0 otherwise
Ext. Coast Dummy: value of 1 if provinces is a lies on the Mediteranean or Black Sea; 0 otherwise
Int. Coast Dummy: value of 1 if provinces is a lies on the Sea of Marmara; 0 otherwise
Asian Border Dummy: value of 1 if province shares a land-locked border with an Asian country, 0 otherwise
Number of container ports operating in a province
Istanbul Dummy: value of 1 if province is Istanbul, 0 otherwise
D_Istanbul Distance, in degrees, to Istanbul
AKP02
Prosperity02
CenRVS02
KemRVS02
NatRVS02
IslRVS99
CenRVS99
KemRVS99
NatRVS99
IslAvgRVS90s
NatAvgRVS90s
Inc99
Number of 
Container Ports
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Figure 4.3: Summary Statistics for all Variables (excluding dummies)
Variable Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
25.115 25.435 10.522 4.5987 44.215
1.9841 1.5755 1.3542 0.25562 7.3711
17.247 15.085 6.8936 4.0649 32.734
13.19 12.135 6.1626 2.003 29.428
7.1393 7.0541 3.3197 1.0429 22.191
12.234 11.831 5.6121 1.8994 26.482
17.247 15.068 6.8936 4.0649 32.734
21.18 21.701 10.578 2.7778 48.124
15.895 16.105 7.948 1.5432 33.8
14.937 15.098 6.9172 2.5729 30.462
7.7426 7.5261 3.7419 0.95608 16.051
Latitude.N 39.25 39.417 1.5294 36.2 42.033
Longitude.E 35.091 34.954 5.0365 26.414 44.044
Crash 4.6432 4.4 6.9557 -13.2 21.2
MinD_EQ 5.2684 4.1844 3.5347 0.062672 12.558
30.455 34.531 12.087 3.6137 47.988
URB 55.467 54.476 11.917 26.053 90.686
EDU 12.958 12.386 3.516 7.1257 26.832
WOM 9.8623 7.8888 5.4686 2.126 28.012
ENT 23.939 24.239 3.7227 14.537 33.479
D_Istanbul 7.0587 6.4846 0 15.176 4.3043
AKP02
Prosperity02
CenRVS02
KemRVS02
NatRVS02
IslRVS99
CenRVS99
KemRVS99
NatRVS99
IslAvgRVS90s
NatAvgRVS90s
Inc99
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Table 5.1: Simple Party-Competition Model
Dependent Variables
constant -12.9438 0.197507 -4.10456 8.69645 4.8539(0.00175)*** (0.7828) (0.12780) (0.00007)*** (0.00309)***
1.42178 0.1767671 -0.148142 -0.2128 -0.243853
(<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (0.11649) (0.00437)*** (0.00004)***
0.257335 0.0240624 0.637066 -0.156951 0.014116
(0.01762)** (0.2086) (<0.00001)*** (0.00558)*** (0.73902)
0.265665 -0.00752347 0.340165 0.459195 -0.0207766
(0.00026)*** (0.5465) (<0.00001)***  (<0.00001)***  (0.45444)
0.577289 -0.0481134 0.0909245 0.0595871 0.338923
(<0.00001)*** (0.0013)*** (0.09516)* (0.15781) (<0.00001)***
R-Squared 0.75478 0.526073 0.744957 0.807675 0.609672
Independent  
Variables AKP02 Prosperity02 CenRVS02 KemRVS02 NatRVS02
IslRVS99
CenRVS99
KemRVS99
NatRVS99
*The numbers in parentheses are the p-values associated with each coefficient  
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Table 5.2: Tests of the Crisis and Response Hypothesis
I II III IV V VI
Controls GDP GDP+ Quakes Quakes+ All
Constant -21.2172 -21.1396 -15.0195 -17.9714 -4.74771 -3.52694(0.2412) (0.2465) (0.4077) (0.2759) (0.7863) (0.8412)
1.07156 1.07207 1.07346 0.909041 0.878234 0.881125
(<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)***
0.686277 0.690418 0.476236 0.466561 0.270555 0.258195
(0.0007)*** (0.0010)*** (0.1494) (0.0139)** (0.3577) (0.3965)
Latitude.N 1.2531 1.25888 1.00341 0.459124 0.327486 0.311595(0.0032)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0388)** (0.2806) (0.4809) (0.5103)
Longitude.E -0.688818 -0.697191 -0.611888 0.514247 0.587508 0.503815(<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (0.0275)** (0.1128) (0.1102) (0.1937)
Crash -0.01088 0.655355 0.347551(0.9262) (0.0392)** (0.2453)
-0.0205077 -0.0108183
(0.0265)** (0.2183)
MinD_EQ -1.93044 -3.20391 -2.88362(0.0001)*** (<0.00001)*** (0.0006)***
0.0437361 0.0365849
(0.0383)** (0.0954)*
0.10795 -0.245824 -0.179559
(0.4572) (0.2252) (0.3923)
R-Squared 0.741819 0.741849 0.759842 0.788763 0.801848 0.806065
Independent 
Variables
Regressions (dep. Variable: AKP02)
IslAvgRVS90s
NatAvgRVS90s
Crash*Inc99
MinD_EQ*Inc99
Inc99
*The numbers in parentheses are the p-values associated with each coefficient  
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Table 5.3: Modernization Tests for the  New Messages Hypothesis
Independent
Variables I II III IV V
Constant
-26.9427 -23.215 -20.9952 -9.309 -13.2049
(0.1801) (0.2090) (0.2492) (0.6065) (0.5178)
1.06084 1.08392 1.06611 1.08002 1.06896
(<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)***
0.70775 0.668789 1.24424 0.734686 0.766876
(0.0006)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0004)***
Latitude.N 1.32081 1.24656 1.25525 1.18188 1.2231(0.0027)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0041)*** (0.0053)***
Longitude.E -0.660267 -0.669304 -0.687283 -0.685691 -0.656745(<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)***
URB 0.0371353 0.0220079(0.5006) (0.7368)
EDU 0.117335 0.054572(0.5373) (0.8087)
WOM -0.0395622 -0.0760191(0.7337) (0.5105)
ENT
-0.406191 -0.406186
(0.0140)** (0.0163)**
R-Squared 0.743386 0.743134 0.74222 0.761917 0.764227
Regressions (dep. Variable: AKP02)
IslAvgRVS90s
NatAvgRVS90s
*The numbers in parentheses are the p-values associated with each coefficient 
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Table 5.4: Geographic Tests for New Messages Hypothesis
Independent
Variables I II III IV
Constant
-19.534 -18.8046 -15.2911 -19.1108
(0.2825) (0.3063) (0.4068) (0.2937)
1.1357 1.13063 1.14443 1.07313
(<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)***
0.736836 0.735865 0.704818 0.659536
(0.0006)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0012)***
Latitude.N 1.17484 1.12775 1.07358 1.23433(0.0068)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0176)** (0.0037)***
Longitude.E -0.713016 -0.678847 -0.717543 -0.719254(<0.00001)*** (0.0002)*** (<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)***
Border 1.98028(0.2104)
Int. Coast 0.213189 0.475998 0.273652(0.9536) (0.8990) (0.9415)
Ext. Coast 2.2568 2.75691(0.1991) (0.1236)
Asian Border 1.30175 1.46105(0.5900) (0.5436)
-3.30981 -2.39403
(0.1754) (0.3104)
R-Squared 0.747711 0.748192 0.754576 0.745361
Regressions (dep. Variable: AKP02)
IslAvgRVS90s
NatAvgRVS90s
Number of 
Container Ports
*The numbers in parentheses are the p-values associated with each coefficient 
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Independent
Variables I II
Constant -42.3395 -17.7128(0.0184)** (0.4711)
0.923838 0.9189
(<0.00001)*** (<0.00001)***
0.554479 0.440171
(0.0039)*** (0.0319)**
Latitude.N 0.415082 0.479985(0.3545) (0.2839)
Longitude.E 1.47873 0.483141(0.0153)** (0.5976)
D_Istanbul -2.65321 0.0367188(0.0003)*** (0.9854)
Istanbul -7.44881 -3.55667(0.1736) (0.5569)
MinD_EQ
-1.95779
(0.1552)
R-Squared 0.784179 0.790111
Table 5.5: Erdoğan's Charisma Tests
Regressions (dep. Variable: AKP02)
IslAvgRVS90s
NatAvgRVS90s
*The numbers in parentheses are the p-values associated with 
each coefficient 
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